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Abstract
This paper attempts to determine empirically whether China is
taking foreign direct investment (FDI) away from other Asian
economies (the “China effect”). A random-effects simultaneous
equation model, controlling for the determinants of inward FDI of
eight East and Southeast Asian economies over 1985–2001 and
using China’s inward FDI as an indicator of the China effect, indi-
cates that China’s FDI level is positively related to these econo-
mies’ FDI levels and negatively related to their shares in FDI in
Asia. Moreover, openness, corporate tax rates, and corruption can
exert a greater influence on these countries’ FDI than China’s FDI.
1. Introduction
In recent years, China has become a favorite destination
for foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2002, FDI in China
reached US$53 billion. For 2003, despite the problems as-
sociated with SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome),
China received US$54 billion worth of FDI, which was
substantially larger than the US$30 billion received by the
United States.
* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the sixth Asian
Economic Panel meeting on 9–10 October 2003 in Seoul, South
Korea. We appreciate the comments from Wing Thye Woo,
Marcus Noland, Gordon de Brouwer, Yunjong Wang, Chan
Kang, Chou Ji, Yiping Huang, Xiao Geng, Sylvie Démurger,
Fredrik Sjöholm, Angang Hu, and other participants at the con-
ference. This research is supported by the Asian Economic
Panel and by a grant from the University Grants Committee of
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China (Project
No. AoE/H-05/99).
Most of China’s Asian neighbors are worried about the prospect of China’s becom-
ing “the factory of the world.” Several Asian governments have publicly noted that
China’s economic rise and its attractiveness as a location for low-cost export plat-
forms have diverted direct investment away from their economies. Policymakers
throughout the region are convinced that the rise of China has contributed to the
“hollowing out” phenomenon; that is, foreign and domestic investors have been
withdrawing funds and relocating production from their own countries and invest-
ing in China instead. This has led to continued loss of manufacturing industries and
jobs, further weakening the vitality of these economies.1
In this paper, we examine empirically the question of this “China effect”; in particu-
lar, whether China has diverted FDI away from a group of eight East and Southeast
Asian economies (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Indone-
sia, the Philippines, and Thailand). The research strategy is to control for the stan-
dard determinants of FDI, add a proxy to represent the China effect, and investigate
the sign, signiªcance, and magnitude of this effect.
2. Literature review and policy concerns
Many analysts, commentators, and policymakers in Asia have voiced concerns
about the economic rise of China and China’s possible adverse affect on direct in-
vestment ºows into their countries. In November 2002, the Deputy Prime Minister
of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong (who has since become the Prime Minister of Singa-
pore), commented that “Southeast Asian countries are under intense competitive
pressure, as their former activities, especially labor-intensive manufacturing, mi-
grate to China. One indicator of this massive shift is the fact that Southeast Asia
used to attract twice as much FDI as Northeast Asia, but the ratio is reversed.”2 Ac-
cording to KOTRA, the state-run trade and investment promotion agency of South
Korea, the growth rate of FDI in most Asian countries is falling as global investors
are being drawn to invest in China.3 The World Economic Forum director for Asia,
Frank J. Richter, said that if the Asian countries do not take prudent and pragmatic
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1 The trade and investment relationship between China and the Southeast Asian economies is
expected to intensify, as a result of the accord signed by China and the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) on 29 November 2004 that is aimed at creating a free trade area
by 2010. Recent literature related to the impact of the rise of China on other economies in-
clude McGibbin and Woo (2003), Chantasasawat et al. (2004a, 2004b), and Eichengreen and
Tong (2005).
2 “China’s Rise Is the Most Dramatic Change in Asia,” ChinaOnline, 14 November 2002.
3 Sung-jin Kim, “Foreign Investment Likely to Fall,” The Korea Times, 26 August 2002.
steps to be as competitive as China, the FDI ºows into these economies would be
adversely affected.4 Taiwan’s Vice Premier, Lin Hsin-I, said that given the rapid rise
of the mainland Chinese economy, Taiwan would have to take effective measures to
increase its competitiveness. Taiwan has to implement the “Go South” policy to en-
courage Taiwanese to switch their investments from the mainland to Southeast
Asian countries.5
What determines FDI ºows into Asian (and other) economies? Is there a China ef-
fect? To gain some insight concerning the methodology we should use to answer
these questions, in particular the appropriate explanatory variables, we brieºy re-
view some relevant academic literature.
Brainard (1997) empirically examines the determinants of the ratio of U.S. export
sales to total foreign sales (the sum of exports and sales by foreign afªliates by in-
dustry). She uses a framework that focuses on factors that favor concentration of
production (i.e., factors that favor export sales) versus proximity to overseas cus-
tomers (i.e., factors that favor sales by foreign afªliates). The explanatory variables
include freight costs to the export market, tariffs of the host country, per capita gross
domestic product, corporate tax rates, measures of trade and FDI openness, and
measures of plant scale economies and corporate scale economies. She also includes
a dummy representing whether a country has experienced a political coup in the
last decade. In her random-effects estimation, almost all the variables have the right
signs and are signiªcant. The major exception is the corporate tax rate, which has
the opposite sign, as predicted.
Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998) focus on policy reforms in developing
countries as determinants of FDI inºows. They employ both ordinary-least-squares
and panel estimations. Expected rates of growth, corporate tax rates, degree of cor-
ruption, and degree of openness to FDI are all important determinants of FDI ºows
into these economies. Hines (1995) and Wei (1997) both examine the impact of insti-
tutional factors on FDI. By employing a corruption index, Hines shows that after
1977, U.S. FDI grew faster in less-corrupt countries. Wei (1997) uses OECD direct in-
vestment data and shows that both corruption and tax rates have negative effects on
FDI ºows. Wei’s estimations are cross-sectional.6
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4 “Future Flows of FDI into Asian Economies to Depend on China,” New Straits Times–
Management Times, 9 March 2002.
5 “Taiwan to Improve Competitiveness,” Taiwanese Central News Agency, 21 November 2002.
6 Other related literature includes Bao et al. (2002), Fung, Iizaka, and Siu (2003), and Zhang
and Song (2001).
3. The empirical model
In this section we describe the econometric model we use to estimate the impact of
FDI in China on the inward direct investment in various Asian economies. The
economies we examine are those of Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, South Korea,
Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Data are from 1985 to 2001. Our
strategy is to control for all the standard explanatory variables of FDI in the Asian
economies, and we add an additional variable representing the China factor. The
level of inºow of China’s FDI is our proxy for the China factor. Obviously, Chinese
inward FDI can be dependent on the inward direct investment of our group of
Asian economies as well as on the standard explanatory variables. To capture such a
reciprocal relationship between the inºow of FDI in China and that of the other
Asian economies, the FDI equations for both the Asian economies and China are es-
timated simultaneously.
The basic regression models for inward FDI for the Asian countries and for China
are written as linear speciªcations of the following form:
ln(AFDIi,t)  0 1ln(CHINA_FDIt)  1ln(AGROWTHi,t)  2ln(ACORRUPTi,t)
ln(AFDIi,t)  3ln(ADUTYi,t)  4ln(AGOVi,t)  5ln(AWAGEi,t)
ln(AFDIi,t)  6ln(AOPENi,t)  7ln(AILLITi,t)  8ln(ACPTAXi,t)  9ln(ATELi,t)
ln(AFDIi,t)  10ln(AINCOMEi,t) (1)
ln(CHINA_FDIt)  0  1ln(AFDIi,t)  1ln(CGROWTHt)  2ln(CCORRUPTt)
ln(CHINA_FDIt)  3ln(CDUTYt)  4ln(CGOVt)  5ln(CWAGEt)  6ln(COPENt)
ln(CHINA_FDIt)  7ln(CINCOMEt), (2)
where the subscripts stand for country i at period t. Variables beginning with the let-
ter “A” denote variables of the Asian countries, and those beginning with the letter
“C” denote variables of China.7 (See appendix A for descriptions of variables.)
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7 AFDIi,t  the level of inward FDI in the ith Asian economy at time t; CHINA_FDIt  inward
FDI into China in year t; GROWTHi,t  growth rate of GDP of country i at time t;
CORRUPTi,t  an index of corruption of country i at time t; DUTYi,t  import duty of coun-
try i at time t; WAGEi,t  average wage in manufacturing of country i at time t; OPENi,t  the
share of exports and imports in GDP of country i at time t; ILLITi,t  the percentage of peo-
ple who are illiterate in country i at time t; CPTAXi,t  corporate tax rate of country i at time
t; GOVi,t  an index of government stability of country i at time t; TELi,t  number of tele-
phone mainlines per 1,000 people of country i at time t; INCOMEi,t  per capita GDP of
country i at time t.
The independent variables examined in the analysis are believed to exert an
inºuence on inward FDI in each Asian country and in China by changing the invest-
ment environment through institutional and policy changes and through economic
conditions. The main variable that we examine in this paper is the proxy for the
China effect, CHINA_FDI. Two important aspects of increases in China’s FDI should
be considered in our analysis. First, when multinational enterprises (MNEs) are de-
ciding on a low-wage export platform, they may choose between investing in China
and investing in another Asian country, say Thailand. In this case, the MNEs will
study a whole set of factors (e.g., wage rates, political risks, and infrastructure) that
make a country desirable as a site for low-cost production, and a decision to invest
in China will result in a reduction of the FDI in Thailand. The sign of CHINA_FDI,
according to this argument, is negative. We call this the investment- diversion effect.
A second aspect of increased FDI in China concerns the production and resource
linkages between a growing China and the rest of Asia. In manufacturing, this takes
the form of further specialization and increasing fragmentation of the production
processes. Suppose that an investor sets up factories in both China and Thailand to
take advantage of their respective competitiveness in distinct stages of production.
Components and parts are then traded among China and other Asian economies.
An increase in China’s FDI is then positively related to an increase in Thailand’s
FDI. A different but complementary argument is that as China grows, its market size
increases and its appetite for minerals and resources also increases. Subsequently,
foreign ªrms rush into China to produce and sell in China. At the same time, other
multinationals invest in other parts of Asia to extract minerals and resources to ex-
port to a fast-growing China in need of a whole spectrum of raw materials. This line
of reasoning leads one to predict that the sign of CHINA_FDI will be positive. We
call this effect the investment-creation effect. Theoretically, we cannot determine a pri-
ori the net effect of investment creation and investment diversion for China; this is-
sue must be examined empirically.
A substantial literature conªrms empirically the importance of both the current mar-
ket size and the growth factor of the host economy, as measured by GDP per capita
and GDP growth rate, respectively. Foreign investors that target local markets are
assumed to be more attracted to a country with a higher GDP growth rate because it
indicates a larger potential demand for their products. The effect of this variable on
their investment incentive, therefore, is assumed to be larger than the effect of this
variable on the incentive of foreign investors who are not local-market seekers. Fur-
thermore, for foreign investors who operate in industries characterized by relatively
large economies of scale, the importance of the host country’s current market size
and its economy’s potential for growth is magniªed. This is because such investors
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can exploit scale economies only after the market attains a certain threshold size. In
our analysis, per capita GDP and growth rate of GDP are used as indicators for cur-
rent market size and market potential for the products of foreign investors, respec-
tively. Thus the expected signs for these variables are positive.
Because the cost of labor is a major component of the cost function, various versions
of wage variables are frequently tested in the literature. A high nominal wage, other
things being equal, deters inward FDI. This is true particularly for the ªrms that en-
gage in labor-intensive production activities. Therefore, conventionally, the expected
sign for this variable is negative. However, the results of various empirical analyses
of the effect of labor cost on investment incentives are not in agreement. Some stud-
ies indicate that there is no signiªcant correlation between labor costs and inward
FDI, whereas others demonstrate a positive relationship between these variables.
The latter result is often attributed to an advanced level of labor productivity or
high quality of human capital that may be reºected in the wage variables (e.g., cases
in which highly skilled labor is actively sought by foreign investors). Our analysis
makes use of average wages in the manufacturing sector.
The level of human capital is demonstrated to be an important determinant of the
marginal productivity of capital. Various studies show that skill-related variables
are host-country speciªc. When a host country is more appealing to foreign invest-
ment in production that requires a relatively low level of skills, the importance of
the human capital variable tends to be small. Labor skills can be a more signiªcant
factor for a host country in which more capital- and technology-intensive invest-
ment projects are concentrated. In this analysis, we utilize the illiteracy rate as a
proxy for the level of human capital.
We examine the hypothesis that better-developed regions with a superior quality of
infrastructure are more attractive to foreign ªrms relative to others by including in
our regressions a proxy for developed infrastructure, the number of telephone main-
lines per 1,000 people.
We also examine the signiªcance of institutional factors in the determination of FDI
by incorporating indexes of the level of corruption and of the stability of each gov-
ernment into the regressions. Corruption can discourage FDI by inducing a higher
cost of doing business. Hines (1995) shows that FDI originating from the United
States grew more rapidly in less-corrupt countries than in more-corrupt countries
after 1977. Wei (1997) presents an alternative explanation of the large negative and
signiªcant effect of corruption on FDI. Unlike taxes, corruption is not transparent
and involves many arbitrary factors. The agreement between a briber and a corrupt
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ofªcial is hard to enforce and creates more uncertainty about the total questionable
payments or the ªnal outcome. Wei demonstrates that this type of uncertainty in-
duced by corruption leads to a reduction in FDI. The political stability of a govern-
ment can be another important factor in fostering the inºow of FDI. Uncertain polit-
ical environments and their related risks can impede FDI inºows in spite of
favorable economic conditions. Because the indexes of corruption and instability as-
sign higher scores to less-corrupt or more-stable countries, the expected signs of the
variables ACORRUPT and AGOV are positive.
Also included in the analysis are policy-related variables: tariff barriers (proxied by
import duty), corporate tax rates, and openness to foreign trade. The effect of tariffs
on the behavior of MNEs is methodologically demonstrated by Horst (1971). He
predicts that in the face of higher tariffs imposed by the host countries, other things
being equal, MNEs will increase their production abroad and decrease their exports.
More recent models highlight the effect of tariffs on FDI in the context of vertical
and horizontal specialization within MNEs. An MNE engaged in vertical FDI typi-
cally organizes its individual afªliates so that they specialize in different stages of
production of the output, and semi-ªnished products in turn are exported to other
afªliates for further processing. By fragmenting the production process, the parent
organizations and their afªliates take advantage of factor price differentials across
countries. FDI by an MNE with horizontal specialization, on the other hand, in-
volves the MNE’s afªliates’ being engaged in similar types of production. An MNE
engaged in horizontal FDI is generally associated with market-seeking behavior and
its motivation is to avoid trade costs. The choice between engaging in horizontal
FDI or exporting involves comparing the relative advantages of minimizing trade
costs with the savings resulting from economies of scale.
The MNEs that utilize vertical production networks might ªnd it beneªcial to invest
in countries with relatively low tariff barriers because this would result in lower
costs for their imported intermediate products. Therefore, in this case the expected
sign of ADUTY is negative. In contrast, MNEs engaged in horizontal FDI would
likely regard high tariff barriers as an incentive to replace their exports with produc-
tion abroad by their foreign afªliates (Brainard 1997; Carr, Markusen, and Maskus
2001). Such tariff-jumping would imply a positive relationship between ADUTY
and FDI.
AOPEN is included in the regressions to examine the importance of openness of an
economy to international trade. This variable measures the degree of general trade
restrictions of each country. Following the same line of reasoning above, a negative
relationship between openness and market-seeking FDI is expected, and a positive
relationship is expected for export-oriented FDI.
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Another policy-related variable that can inºuence the host country’s location advan-
tage is the host country’s corporate (or other) tax rates. The MNEs, as global proªt
maximizers, can be assumed to be sensitive to tax factors, because taxes have a di-
rect effect on their proªts. Evidence for signiªcant negative inºuences of corporate
tax rates is reported in Wei (1997), Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998), and
Hsiao (2001).
All variables are transformed into logarithms. Data sources and additional explana-
tions of variables are given in appendix A.
In our estimations, we assume for each FDI equation that there is a collection of fac-
tors that are omitted from the regression, and these factors are speciªc to each indi-
vidual country. Therefore, we estimate equations that take the following form:
yit   xit  	i 
it ,
where the disturbance term, 
it , is associated with both time and the cross-sectional
units, and 	i is the random disturbance that is associated with the ith country and is
assumed to be constant through time. In other words, the country-speciªc constant
terms are assumed to be randomly distributed across the cross-sectional units.
The formulation of the model is speciªed as follows.
ln(AFDIi,t)  a0  a1ln(CLNFDi,t)  ln Xi,t bi  ui  ei,t (3)
ln(CLNFDi,t)  0  1ln(AFDIi,t)  ln Zi,t i  vi  wi,t , (4)
where X and Z are vectors of explanatory variables from equations (1) and (2), re-
spectively; ei,t and wi,t are disturbance terms, and ui and vi are the individual-
country-effect terms. The above simultaneous equation system is estimated by a
two-stage least-squares regression (2SLS).
4. Results
4.1 Regressions using levels of FDI inºows
Table 1 shows the results from the ªrst set of random-effects simultaneous regres-
sions using the levels of FDI inºows as the dependent variables. To avoid a
multicollinearity problem, variables that are highly correlated are not included
simultaneously. Therefore AWAGE, AINCOME, ATEL, and AOPEN are not all
included at the same time in the same speciªcations. For each of the dependent vari-
ables, there are ªve speciªcations. Speciªcation (1) includes AWAGE but not ATEL
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and AINCOME (column 1). In speciªcation (2), we look at the effect of ATEL and
leave out AWAGE and AINCOME. Speciªcation (3) examines ATEL by additionally
excluding AOPEN because of its moderate correlation with ATEL. The effect of
AINCOME is studied in speciªcations (4) and (5), with and without the AOPEN
variable, respectively. Note that, in an attempt to keep the variables consistent in the
equations for Asia and the equations for China, when a particular variable of the
Asian equation is of interest, we try to include that same variable in the China equa-
tion provided this does not risk signiªcant multicollinearity. For example, ATEL and
CTEL are included when attention is given to the effect of infrastructure.
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Table 1. Level of FDI inºows. Random-effects two-stage least-squares regressions
(level of FDI inºows dependent variable)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CHINA_FDI (2(0.4725***
(7.49)
(0.4961***
(7.48)
(0.5684***
(7.81)
(0.4907***
(7.71)
(0.5182***
(7.53)
AGROWTH (0.4543
(0.58)
(0.6442
(0.82)
(0.3867
(0.44)
(0.5461
(0.69)
(0.2643
(0.31)
ACORRUPT (0.1417
(0.60)
(0.1906
(0.79)
(0.4767*
(1.81)
(0.0659
(0.27)
(0.4121
(1.65)
ADUTY (0.0971
(0.47)
(0.1375
(0.67)
(0.3904*
(1.94)
(0.1142
(0.53)
(0.2109
(0.95)
AGOV (0.1032
(0.63)
(0.1160
(0.67)
(0.0014
(0.01)
(0.0631
(0.38)
(0.0525
(0.29)
AWAGE (0.1635
(1.41)
AOPEN (0.9966***
(5.72)
(1.0460***
(5.35)
(0.8717***
(4.71)
AILLIT (0.0509
(0.29)
(0.0823
(0.47)
(0.4864***
(2.72)
(0.2158
(1.26)
(0.5056**
(2.92)
ACPTAX (1.2869***
(3.42)
(1.3944***
(3.55)
(0.4384
(1.12)
(1.1889***
(3.10)
(0.4614**
(1.21)
ATEL (0.1370
(1.45)
(0.1809**
(2.21)
AINCOME (0.0009
(0.01)
(0.3097***
(2.92)
Constant (2.8792*
(1.80)
(2.1280
(1.43)
(1.2382*
(0.75)
(1.7436
(1.02)
(0.0755
(0.04)
R2 (0.6919 (0.6915 (0.6136 (0.6857 (0.6272
F-test: p-value (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000
Observations 130 131 131 131 131
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. CHINA_FDI inward FDI into China. AGROWTH growth rate of GDP of Asian
country. ACORRUPT index of corruption of each Asian country. ADUTY import duty of each Asian country. AGOV index
of government stability of each Asian country. AWAGE average wage in manufacturing of each Asian country. AOPEN share of
exports and imports in GDP of each Asian country. AILLIT percentage of people who are illiterate in each Asian country.
ACPTAX corporate tax rate of each Asian country. ATEL number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people of each Asian country.
AINCOME per capita GDP of each Asian country.
* Statistically signiªcant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically signiªcant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically signiªcant at the 1 percent level.
Our main variable of interest, CHINA_FDI, is positive and highly signiªcant in all
speciªcations. A 10-percent increase in the FDI inºows to China would raise the
level of FDI inºows to the eight East and Southeast Asian countries by about 5 to
6 percent, depending on the particular speciªcation. Despite considerable concerns
in policy circles that an increase in FDI inºows to China is at the expense of other re-
gional economies, our study shows that these economies can actually beneªt from
such increases in FDI. This result may be linked to the production-networking activ-
ities among Asian countries as well as to the increased demand for resources by a
growing China. The evidence for production networking among China and other
Asian economies can be found in the substantial two-way trade of intermediate and
ªnal goods in the same industries among those countries. These economic ties of
mutual dependence have been deepening rapidly since the 1990s, and the
signiªcance of the China effect to our Asian countries’ FDI inºows may reºect such
interdependence. In sum, our empirical study shows that an increase in China’s FDI
is positively and signiªcantly related to FDI inºows in other Asian economies. Our
central result is that the investment-enhancing effect dominates the investment-
diversion effect, so that on net China is a positive force for FDI inºows into other
Asian economies.
The effect of openness, denoted by the variable AOPEN, has the expected positive
sign and is always signiªcant (when included in the regressions). Openness cap-
tures the degree of both tariff and non-tariff measures, including trade impedi-
ments. In contrast to the effect of tariff barriers (proxied by the variable ADUTY),
the impact of openness to trade on the inºow of FDI is substantial. The results in
table 1 suggest that, other things being equal, the marginal effect of trade liberaliza-
tion of the Asian countries on their FDI inºows is approximately twice as large as
that of the China effect. Trade impediments can take various forms, such as local
content requirements, technology transfer requirements, and domestic sales and ex-
port requirements. Our results imply that reductions in these types of trade barriers
can play a vital role in promoting FDI in the Asian countries.
Corporate tax is another variable that is found to exert a large inºuence on the level
of FDI inºows in this analysis. Although many countries offer various forms of tax
incentives for foreign investors, corporate tax rates can be considered one of the
most inºuential tools to promote investment because they have a direct impact on
the proªtability of foreign investment projects.
Unlike the results of many previous studies, our analysis suggests that the growth
rate of GDP does not play an important role in attracting FDI. Per capita income,
however, is found to be a signiªcant factor, but only in speciªcation (5). This seems
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to suggest that foreign investors’ decisions to invest in Asia are more sensitive to
current market size than to the market potential for their products.
Infrastructure in the form of communications infrastructure, as roughly measured
by ATEL, is signiªcant in speciªcation (3) but not in speciªcation (2) because ATEL is
moderately correlated with AOPEN. Communications infrastructure appears to be a
favorable characteristic for foreign investors, in terms of the magnitude of its effect,
but other key variables in the equation overshadow its inºuence.
Notwithstanding its insigniªcance in almost all of the speciªcations, ADUTY reveals
its marginally negative effect on FDI in speciªcation (3). Many of the East and
Southeast Asian countries examined here are heavily involved in vertical specializa-
tion, particularly in the electric and electronics industries. This vertical network is
evident in the share of two-way trade in the same industry in the total volume of
trade among these Asian nations. A reduction in tariff barriers can stimulate FDI in
the host country by lowering the costs associated with intra-ªrm input trade.
The relatively large positive effect of illiteracy on FDI found in speciªcations (3) and
(5) is puzzling. One possible reason for this relationship is that FDI in the region
tends to seek out cheap labor, which is often correlated with high rates of illiteracy.
In the literature, the degree of government instability and the index of corruption
are found to be always negatively associated with the level of FDI. However, neither
of these institutional factors (the AGOV or ACORRUPT variables) appears to have
an important effect in speciªcations (1) to (5). In other words, corruption or govern-
ment instability is unlikely to have signiªcantly discouraged FDI in this group of
countries.
Table 1 shows the results of the basic core set of our empirical exercises. We also ex-
plore alternative ways and robustness checks of testing for the China effect and in
the following sections report the results of regressions that (1) exclude Hong Kong
from the sample; (2) deªne the dependent variable as the eight East and Southeast
Asian countries’ shares in FDI inºows to Asia; and (3) include a new variable, the
total global supply of FDI (OUTFLOW).
4.2 Regressions without Hong Kong
Investment from Hong Kong to China has increased dramatically since the early
1980s, and Hong Kong is by far the largest foreign investor in China at present.
However, it has been frequently claimed that a signiªcant portion of such invest-
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ment originates from China itself or from countries outside Hong Kong. Much of
China’s capital outºow that takes place through legal or illegal channels to Chinese
ªrms located in Hong Kong ªnds its way back to China as FDI. This type of round-
tripping of funds is mostly used to escape regulations (e.g., barriers to trade) or to
gain eligibility for incentives available only to foreign investors (e.g., tax conces-
sions). According to the World Bank (2002), round-tripping accounts for 20 to 30
percent of FDI in China. Hong Kong is also used as a stepping stone for investment
to China: a large number of foreign ªrms use afªliates in Hong Kong to invest in
China on their behalf.
To determine whether Hong Kong’s peculiar position leads to different results than
those of our core analysis, we eliminate Hong Kong from our sample countries and
reexamine the panel analysis. The results are shown in table 2. Interestingly, we ªnd
that the results for all eight countries generally hold when Hong Kong is excluded
from the regressions. China’s FDI has a signiªcant positive effect on Asian FDI,
conªrming that there is no negative diversionary effect in terms of the level of FDI
inºows to its Asian neighbors. Our results also indicate that FDI inºow can be
greatly promoted by reducing the level of corporate tax and by increasing the de-
gree of openness in international trade through lowering tariff and non-tariff barri-
ers and by abolishing various trade impediments (table 2). The importance of estab-
lishing a large market is also evident. Corruption appears to have a larger and more
signiªcant inºuence on FDI inºows when the panel is analyzed without Hong
Kong. This may be attributed to the fact that Hong Kong demonstrates the lowest
level of corruption on average among all countries examined. The importance of the
variable may be higher among corrupt economies.
4.3 Regressions using countries’ FDI shares in FDI inºows to Asian countries
We use a country’s share of FDI that goes to Asia as the dependent variable in equa-
tion (3) of the model to see whether an increase in China’s FDI diverts FDI away
from the group, reducing their share of total FDI inºows to Asia. Note that the de-
pendent variable in equation (4), for China, is still the level of China’s FDI. One
might use China’s share of the total FDI inºows to Asia rather than the level of
China’s FDI. However, between 1985 and 2001, FDI in China and the eight East and
Southeast Asian countries accounted for 89 percent of the total FDI inºows to Asia.
Thus, an increase in China’s share of total FDI inºow to Asia would almost certainly
ensure a reduction in the East and Southeast Asian countries’ share of total FDI
inºow. To avoid this, we continue to use the level of China’s FDI inºows in the
regressions.
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Given that direct investment inºows into China and our eight Asian economies con-
stitute the bulk of direct investment into Asia,8 it may not be surprising if the regres-
sion results show that, out of the total FDI received by Asia, an increase in China’s
inward FDI reduces an individual country’s share. Nonetheless, it is useful to esti-
mate the impact. Our results conªrm that an increase in FDI to China undoubtedly
decreases the proportion of FDI that each country obtains. A 10-percent increase in
the level of China’s FDI causes the East and Southeast Asian countries’ shares in FDI
to Asia to drop by about 2 to 3 percent. Although a larger share of FDI received by
China appears to come at the expense of its neighboring countries, FDI promotion
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Table 2. Level of FDI inºows without Hong Kong. Random-effects two-stage least-squares
regressions (level of FDI inºows dependent variable)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CHINA_FDI (0.4794***
(7.29)
(0.5063***
(7.36)
(0.5681***
(7.48)
(0.5064***
(7.60)
(0.5279***
(7.33)
AGROWTH (0.5372
(0.68)
(0.7329
(0.93)
(0.2450
(0.28)
(0.6113
(0.77)
(0.1231
(0.14)
ACORRUPT (0.3447
(1.39)
(0.3499
(1.39)
(0.5552**
(2.01)
(0.2356
(0.92)
(0.4711*
(1.74)
ADUTY (0.0253
(0.12)
(0.07801
(0.37)
(0.2907
(1.32)
(0.0633
(0.28)
(0.0974
(0.40)
AGOV (0.2275
(1.06)
(0.2060
(0.94)
(0.1485
(0.61)
(0.2425
(1.12)
(0.0639
(0.28)
AWAGE (0.1963
(1.65)
AOPEN (1.0261***
(5.48)
(1.0620***
(4.99)
(0.8830***
(4.37)
AILLIT (0.0233
(0.13)
(0.0808
(0.45)
(0.5080***
(2.85)
(0.2122
(1.20)
(0.5310***
(3.05)
ACPTAX (1.5079***
(3.30)
(1.6033***
(3.33)
(0.2246
(0.51)
(1.3361***
(2.82)
(0.2188
(0.51)
ATEL (0.1359
(1.40)
(0.1795**
(2.18)
AINCOME (0.0148
(0.12)
(0.3014***
(2.78)
Constant (4.0785**
(2.18)
(3.0912*
(1.79)
(0.6266
(0.34)
(2.5455
(1.25)
(0.8821
(0.43)
R2 (0.6546 (0.6519 (0.5648 (0.6447 (0.5792
F-test: p-value (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000
Observations 114 115 115 115 115
Note: t-statistics are reported in parentheses. CHINA_FDI inward FDI into China. AGROWTH growth rate of GDP of each
Asian country. ACORRUPT index of corruption of each Asian country. ADUTY import duty of each Asian country. AGOV
index of government stability of each Asian country. AWAGE average wage in manufacturing of each Asian country. AOPEN
share of exports and imports in GDP of each Asian country. AILLIT percentage of people who are illiterate in each Asian country.
ACPTAX corporate tax rate of each Asian country. ATEL number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people of each Asian country.
AINCOME per capita GDP of each Asian country.
* Statistically signiªcant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically signiªcant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically signiªcant at the 1 percent level.
8 A list of countries regarded as constituting Asia is given in appendix B.
could come from the internal economic policy of each country, such as the level of
corporate tax and the degree of openness in foreign trade. The inºuence of openness
on FDI is at least twice as large as that of the China effect, and more than four times
as large as the China effect in speciªcations (1), (2), and (4). Similarly, the inºuence
of corporate taxes on FDI is more than three times as large as that of the China
effect.
Also evident from table 3 is the much larger and signiªcant effect of corruption,
compared with the effects of this variable as shown in table 1. A 1-percent decrease
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Table 3. Shares of the eight Asian economies’ FDI inºows in total FDI inºows to Asia.
Random-effects two-stage least-squares regressions (individual country’s shares in FDI to
Asia dependent variable)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CHINA_FDI (0.2544***
(4.45)
(0.2580***
(4.31)
(0.1974***
(3.05)
(0.2355***
(4.09)
(0.2127***
(3.47)
AGROWTH (0.4250
(0.60)
(0.5296
(0.75)
(0.2997
(0.39)
(0.5123
(0.72)
(0.2810
(0.37)
ACORRUPT (0.3242
(1.52)
(0.3913*
(1.79)
(0.6411***
(2.73)
(0.2490
(1.14)
(0.5337**
(2.40)
ADUTY (0.0093
(0.05)
(0.0409
(0.22)
(0.4181**
(2.33)
(0.0285
(0.15)
(0.2389
(1.21)
AGOV (0.2103
(1.41)
(0.2545
(1.63)
(0.1574
(0.92)
(0.1711
(1.13)
(0.1622
(1.00)
AWAGE (0.1450
(1.38)
AOPEN (0.8312***
(5.27)
(0.9072***
(5.14)
(0.7172***
(4.28)
AILLIT (0.1316
(0.83)
(0.1153
(0.72)
(0.4636***
(2.91)
(0.2830*
(1.83)
(0.5216***
(3.38)
ACPTAX (1.1312***
(3.32)
(1.2547***
(3.54)
(0.4255
(1.23)
(1.0379***
(2.99)
(0.4393
(1.29)
ATEL (0.1430*
(1.68)
(0.1322*
(1.81)
AINCOME (0.0049
(0.05)
(0.2605***
(2.75)
Constant (3.3251**
(2.30)
(2.9793**
(2.22)
(2.2319
(1.52)
(2.2411
(1.44)
(0.7423
(0.46)
R2 (0.5688 (0.5758 (0.4805 (0.5650 (0.4985
F-test: p-value (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000
Observations 130 131 131 131 131
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. CHINA_FDI inward FDI into China. AGROWTH growth rate of GDP of each
Asian country. ACORRUPT index of corruption of each Asian country. ADUTY import duty of each Asian country. AGOV
index of government stability of each Asian country. AWAGE average wage in manufacturing of each Asian country. AOPEN
share of exports and imports in GDP of each Asian country. AILLIT percentage of people who are illiterate in each Asian country.
ACPTAX corporate tax rate of each Asian country. ATEL number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people of each Asian country.
AINCOME per capita GDP of each Asian country.
* Statistically signiªcant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically signiªcant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically signiªcant at the 1 percent level.
in the degree of corruption is associated with a 0.25–0.64 percentage increase in the
individual share in FDI to Asia, depending on the speciªcation of the equation.
4.4 Regressions with global supply of FDI
Table 4 shows the results of adding to our equations a new explanatory variable,
OUTFLOWt , which is the total amount of the global supply of FDI for year t. One
potential criticism of our central ªnding that FDI in China is positively related to
FDI in the East and Southeast Asian economies is that this correlation could arise
simply because inºows to most economies are dictated by the global supply of capi-
tal of that year. In other words, if OUTFLOWt increases in year t, FDI inºows to both
China and the eight Asian economies are also likely to increase, thereby generating
our main result but without demonstrating that it is clearly related to the China ef-
fect we wish to investigate. To control for the supply-side effect of FDI and to isolate
the estimation of the China effect, we therefore run our panel simultaneous equation
model with the addition of the OUTFLOW variable.
The coefªcients representing the China effect are still positive and signiªcant
(table 4). The magnitudes of the coefªcients, however, are nearly half as large as
those in table 1. The OUTFLOW variable is also positive and signiªcant and has a
larger coefªcient than that of the CHINA_FDI variable. Other variables that are
signiªcant are corporate tax rates, openness, and degrees of corruption. We conªrm
again that the China effect is positive. As before, other determinants related to pol-
icy, institutions, and the global supply of capital have a stronger effect on the
inºows of FDI into these Asian economies.
5. Conclusion
Is China diverting FDI away from other Asian economies? This is the paramount
question on the minds of many academic researchers and policymakers in Asia.
Theoretically, China’s ability to attract FDI could have both investment-creating
effects and investment-diverting effects on Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singa-
pore, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand. We empirically estimate
the determinants of FDI inºows in these economies over the 1985–2001 period. The
standard determinants we consider include GDP growth rates, degrees of openness,
corporate tax rates, indexes of corruption, degrees of government stability, illiteracy
rates, per capita GDP, tariff rates, wage rates, and proxies of infrastructure. To esti-
mate the China effect, we include the level of China’s inward FDI as the dependent
variable in the econometric equations. We use a random-effects simultaneous equa-
tion model to estimate our coefªcients, including the estimation of the coefªcient on
the China effect.
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The main results of our paper are as follows. First, in terms of the level of FDI ºows,
the China effect is positive; that is, FDI inºow to the eight East and Southeast Asian
economies is positively related to direct investment in China. Second, in terms of the
countries’ shares in FDI to Asia, the China effect is negative; that is, although the
level of FDI in China and the level of FDI in these eight economies increase together,
an increase in China’s FDI is associated with a decline in the other economies’ share
of total FDI inºows to Asia. Third, the China effect is not the most important factor
determining the inºows of FDI into these eight East and Southeast Asian economies.
Speciªcally, policy variables such as lower corporate taxes and higher degrees of
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Table 4. Level of FDI, with global supply of FDI variable. Random-effects two-stage
least-squares regressions (level of FDI dependent variable)
Independent variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
CHINA_FDI (0.2979***
(2.690)
(0.2957***
(2.628)
(0.2184*
(1.842)
(0.1960*
(1.911)
(0.2024*
(1.866)
AGROWTH (0.5820
(0.773)
(0.6575
(0.881)
(0.4322
(0.545)
(0.5072
(0.680)
(0.4413
(0.571)
ACORRUPT (0.3713
(1.503)
(0.4375*
(1.716)
(0.8022***
(3.126)
(0.3801
(1.553)
(0.6258***
(2.686)
ADUTY (0.0606
(0.304)
(0.0867
(0.438)
(0.3388*
(1.843)
(0.0707
(0.347)
(0.1188
(0.592)
AGOV (0.0726
(0.456)
(0.1183
(0.712)
(0.0506
(0.287)
(0.0707
(0.445)
(0.0288
(0.174)
AWAGE (0.1168
(1.044)
AOPEN (0.7905***
(4.302)
(0.8705***
(4.405)
(0.5858***
(3.043)
AILLIT (0.2334
(1.330)
(0.2021
(1.168)
(0.5542***
(3.387)
(0.4112**
(2.405)
(0.6551***
(4.118)
ACPTAX (1.2000***
(3.321)
(1.3238***
(3.532)
(0.5793
(1.625)
(1.0496***
(2.875)
(0.5823*
(1.685)
ATEL (0.1282
(1.423)
(0.1077
(1.392)
AINCOME (0.0656
(0.579)
(0.2720***
(2.816)
OUTFLOW (0.4623**
(2.521)
(0.4482**
(2.460)
(0.7083***
(3.860)
(0.6260***
(3.581)
(0.7264***
(4.236)
Constant (1.6157
(0.743)
(1.6647
(0.827)
(4.3587**
(2.133)
(3.8717*
(1.713)
(6.3133***
(2.975)
R2 (0.7206 (0.7222 (0.6819 (0.7212 (0.6975
F-test: p-value (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000 (0.0000
Observations 130 131 131 131 131
Note: t-statistics are shown in parentheses. CHINA_FDI inward FDI into China. AGROWTH growth rate of GDP of Asian
country. ACORRUPT index of corruption of each Asian country. ADUTY import duty of each Asian country. AGOV index
of government stability of each Asian country. AWAGE average wage in manufacturing of each Asian country. AOPEN share of
exports and imports in GDP of each Asian country. AILLIT percentage of people who are illiterate in each Asian country.
ACPTAX corporate tax rate of each Asian country. ATEL number of telephone mainlines per 1,000 people of each Asian country.
AINCOME per capita GDP of each Asian country. OUTFLOW total amount of the global supply of FDI.
* Statistically signiªcant at the 10 percent level.
** Statistically signiªcant at the 5 percent level.
*** Statistically signiªcant at the 1 percent level.
openness play a larger role in attracting investment. In some cases, the regressions
indicate that lower degrees of corruption also lead to higher inºows of FDI.
Appendix A. Deªnitions and sources of data of the variables used in
the model
AFDI and CHINA_FDI: Data on aggregate FDI inºows of each country, aggregate
FDI inºows to Asia, and aggregate FDI to the world are from UNCTAD.
ACORRUPT and CCORRUPT: An index of corruption from the International Coun-
try Risk Guide (ICRG) from the PRS Group. It ranges from 0 to 6. A higher num-
ber means a lower level of corruption.
AGOV and CGOV: An index of government stability from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG) from the PRS Group. The range is from 0 to 12. A higher score
means higher stability of a government.
ADUTY and CDUTY: Import duties are from the IMF’s Government Finance Statistic
Yearbook.
AOPEN and COPEN: Openness  (export  import)/GDP. Export and import data
are from IMF’s Direction of Trade.
AILLIT: The illiteracy rate is the percentage of people aged 15 years and above who
cannot, with understanding, read and write a short, simple statement on their
everyday life. Data are from World Development Indicators.
ACPTAX: Corporate income tax rates, measured in percentage points, are from Price
Waterhouse’s Corporate Taxes—A Worldwide Summary.
ATEL: Telephone mainlines per 1,000 people. Data are from World Development Indi-
cators.
AINCOME and CINCOME: Per capita GDP (GDP/population). GDP data are from
EconStats. Population data are from World Development Indicators (various years).
AGROWTH and CGROWTH: GDP growth, measured in percentage points. Data are
from EconStats.
AWAGE and CWAGE: Average wage in manufacturing. Data are from United
Nations Common Database, LABORSTA, and countries’ ofªcial Web sites.
OUTFLOW: Total supply of FDI outºows are from UNCTAD.
Appendix B. List of the Asian countries used in the calculations of total FDI
in Asia
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia,
China, China Hong Kong SAR, China Macao SAR, China (Taiwan Province of), Cy-
prus, Georgia, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Japan, Jor-
dan, Kazakhstan, Korea (Democratic People’s Republic of), Korea (Republic of),
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Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mal-
dives, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian territory, the Philip-
pines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan,
Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and
Yemen.
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